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A state’s concern for its reputation is widely considered the most powerful 
mechanism for inducing rational egoist states to comply with costly commitments. A 
state with a diversity of interests will accept costs on organised groups in the 
expectation of future benefits derived from a reputation for meeting its international 
commitments. Although the scope of the effectiveness of this argument has been 
qualified by subsequent scholarship, reputational incentives remain a central causal 
mechanism in institutionalist approaches to international relations. This paper 
introduces a new, more fundamental criticism: a state’s reputation for complying with 
international obligations is a public good so far as diverse politically influential 
domestic constituents are concerned: each constituent has an incentive not to accept 
costs towards the maintenance of a states’ overall reputation for fulfilling its 
obligations. We should therefore expect that states will not, in general, fulfil costly 
obligations out of respect for their reputation, unless gains from reputation can be 
reliably internalised in the form of private goods or where domestic politics provides 





































State reputation is the central mechanism driving rational functionalist 
explanations of international cooperation. Reputation provides a reason for rational 
states to comply with costly commitments in the anarchy of international relations, 
allowing cooperation without friendship between egoists. States accept costs on their 
domestic society as required by their international commitments in order to maintain 
their reputation for future instances of cooperation on other issues. Given that 
reputation provides incentives for states to comply with costly commitments, 
Coaseian-style bargaining can provide Pareto-improving solutions to the externalities 
of state policies, where transactions costs are sufficiently low.   
However, despite the widespread influence of this argument, there are 
significant problems with the claim that states will accept costs on domestic 
constituents in order to maintain their international reputation. A state’s reputation for 
complying with costly agreements is a public good, available to different parts of 
society to solve a wide possible range of international cooperation problems in the 
future. As a public good, however, issue-specific organised interests within states 
have incentives to decline to reliably accept costs for its production. Indeed, as with 
public goods in general, the general expectation should be that the public good of a 
state’s international reputation should be persistently underprovided. The most widely 
accepted explanation for international cooperation between rational egoist states 
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 3 should therefore not be expected to provide reliable compliance with costly 
obligations. 
Reputational concerns can however be expected to affect state behaviour 
where such incentives can be reliably internalised, for example where gains from state 
reputation can be considered a private good for organised interests bearing costs, or 
where domestic politics provides can prioritise the production of diffuse public goods 
even at the cost to private interests. In other words, in well-defined circumstances 
reputational incentives for state behaviour can indeed be compelling. 
This paper should be of interest to the widest community of scholars of 
international politics because of the widespread influence of functional regime theory 
in contemporary scholarship as well as its importance in the development of modern 
approaches to international relations. The theoretical discussion it advances suggests a 
new emphasis for empirical work relying on reputational incentives on state behaviour 
as well as offering new perspectives on other debates including the impact of 
democracy on international relations.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section outlines functional regime 
theory’s argument, influentially advanced by Robert O. Keohane, that rational egoist 
states accept costs to maintain their reputation for international cooperation, as 
facilitated by international institutions that provide information and reduce transaction 
costs between states. The second section outlines existing criticisms of state 
reputation as a causal mechanism for state behaviour. The third section sets out 
reasons to consider a state’s general reputation for complying with costly obligations 
as a domestic public good, which will therefore not be reliably provided by domestic 
constituents. The fourth section outlines important implications that accepting state 
reputation as a public good has for wider scholarship in international relations. The 
 4 fifth section outlines two broad sets of circumstances where states will reliably 
internalise reputational incentives. The final section concludes.  
State Reputation and International Cooperation 
The currently dominant theory of international cooperation is functional 
regime theory, sometimes also referred to as ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’ or just plain 
‘institutionalism’.
2 It is an approach to the explanation of international relations which 
is widely understood to rest very considerably on state reputation as a mechanism for 
influencing state behaviour. Brooks and Wohlforth write, “To say that reputation 
plays an important role within institutionalist theory is an understatement”.
3 Simmons 
writes of rationalist approaches to state compliance with costly international 
obligations: “The central mechanism for securing compliance is related to reputation”, 
emphasising long-run costs of failure to comply.
4 Similarly, international lawyers 
now frequently base their understanding of the effects of treaty obligations entirely
rationalist approaches to reputation.
 on 
                                                
5 Dai can even summarise the scholarly literature 
on international institutions as a whole in the following way:  
“Since the mid-1980s work on international institutions has been largely influenced 
by one simple model: the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In the light of this 
model, international institutions are seen as resolving the collective action problem by 
providing compliance information and thereby facilitating compliance mechanisms 
such as reciprocity or reputation”.
6 
 The reputational approach to understanding state behaviour adopted by 
functional regime theory has its counterparts in approaches to studying cooperation 
without hierarchy outside international relations, as Downs and Jones - and elsewhere 
Keohane - emphasise: 
 
2 Keohane 1984. 
3 Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 155. 
4 Simmons 1998, 81. 
5 E.g. Guzman 2008. 
6 Dai 2002, 405. 
 5 “In the past decade, a growing preoccupation with international cooperation and its 
analytical underpinnings have combined to increase the theoretical centrality of 
reputation. In the wake of works such as those by Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, 
and Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, it now stands as the linchpin 
of the dominant neoliberal institutionalist theory of decentralized cooperation”.
7  
 
The central argument of functional regime theory is widely known and indeed 
routinely relied upon by scholars making progress on a diverse range of topics in 
international politics. It may even seem that further consideration of the underlying 
theoretical logic of functional regime theory may no longer be necessary. However, 
the very pervasiveness of reputational approaches to international politics in the 
empirical literature makes continued examination of the theoretical underpinnings 
relevant to a great many contemporary scholars. Empirical work cannot be separated 
from theoretical scholarship because theoretical understandings of state behaviour set 
the terms for the sort of evidence that empirical studies are expected to provide; 
reconsideration of theoretical approaches can therefore suggest reorientation of 
strategies for empirical studies. Furthermore, given that experiments are often difficult 
to perform in the study of international politics, scholars frequently observe a limited 
range of states’ behaviour in equilibria derived from various incentives. Thus 
theoretical discussions frequently have a strong impact on the interpretation of 
observations in international politics.  
Before advancing to an alternative and more fundamental difficulty, it is worth 
reiterating both functional regime theory’s central argument and prominent current 
criticisms. Despite the many hundreds of papers derived one way or another from 
functional regime theory, the argument as set out by Keohane, while much discussed 
and critiqued, has not been superseded or comprehensively restated. Furthermore, 
Keohane’s original text was admirably and unusually clear about alternative 
                                                 
7 Downs and Jones 2002, cf Axelrod 1984; Milgrom, North et al. 1990. 
Similar connections are drawn in Keohane 2002, S313, footnote 16. 
 6 approaches to rational international cooperation, in particular isolating the 
reputational mechanism from other incentives, such as direct retaliation. As a result, 
this paper will primarily draw on the arguments advanced in After Hegemony. 
In functional regime theory, the problem of international cooperation is 
understood as one in which unilateral state behaviour imposes negative externalities 
on other states. Whereas within domestic society, where political control of 
authoritative state institutions allows, actors imposing externalities can be obliged by 
taxation or compulsory regulation to internalise the external costs of their behaviour, 
such compulsion is not possible in international relations. Of course, international 
agreements may be entered into in order to achieve Pareto-improving outcomes for 
participating states. Indeed, functional regime theory builds on the Coase theorem to 
argue that international institutions can improve the ability of states to make Pareto-
improving bargains.
8 The Coase theorem claims that rational actors will bargain to 
internalise the externalities of their behaviour, producing efficient outcomes assuming 
that liabilities can be defined and transactions costs overcome.
9 So, for example, 
ranchers whose cattle damage local crops will be able to come to an efficient 
agreement with neighbouring farmers even in the absence of government regulation 
and coercion. Assuming transaction costs were zero, all externalities would be dealt 
with in a Pareto-efficient manner. In the same way, states in international anarchy 
have Coaseian incentives to seek bargains to internalise the externalities of state 
behaviour. In this analysis, the function of international regimes – seen as clusters of 
international agreements in particular issue-areas – and of international organisations 
is to reduce the transactions costs of bargains. As such, the Coase theorem has been 
                                                 
8 Conybeare 1980. 
9 Coase 1960; Williamson 1985. 
 7 described as ‘the centrepiece of modern functional theory of international 
cooperation’.
10  
In a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma model, however, states have incentives to 
unilaterally defect or free-ride even on Pareto-improving costly international 
commitments regardless of the behaviour of other states, and, in the anarchy of 
international relations, sovereign states cannot be prevented from adopting domestic 
laws and policies contrary to international obligations, if necessary by requiring their 
domestic courts to apply rights and obligations contrary to treaty provisions. 
 However, given repeated interaction and a sufficiently low discount rate, the 
rational egoist state has incentives to avoid free-riding. Strategies of contingent 
cooperation – most prominently, tit-for-tat – can provide mutual incentives for 
cooperation in anarchy.
11 In this way, international cooperation between states is 
modelled very similarly to other forms of social organisation supported by tit-for-tat 
reciprocity, such as the behaviour of firms in oligopoly and dinner party invitations.  
The costs that rational states avoid by failing to free-ride on their costly 
obligations are three-fold. The first possibility, of course, is that the free-riding state 
may face direct retaliation by other states engaged in the international agreements. 
However, direct retaliation is not emphasised in functional regime theory, on the basis 
of the correct observation that many international regimes have no, or very limited, 
retaliatory mechanisms: 
“Yet retaliation for specific violations is not a reliable way to maintain international 
regimes: indeed, the GATT provisions for retaliation have been invoked only once, 
and then ineffectively. Individual governments find it costly to retaliate. Familiar 
problems of collective action arise: if a given state’s violation of a particular rule does 
not have a large effect on any one country, retaliation is unlikely to be severe, even if 
the aggregate effect of the violation is large. If international regimes depended 
                                                 
10 Moravcsik 1998, 58. 
11 Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985. 
 8 entirely for compliance on specific retaliations against transgressors, they would be 
weak indeed.”
12  
A second restraint on state defection is the concern about the precedent that 
such defection may provide for other states. This argument is also rejected, however, 
as a ‘weak reed’ incentive, on the grounds that states have no incentive to internalise 
the ‘collective bad’ to the regime when compared to their individual benefit from 
breaking the rules.
13  
Instead, functional regime theory emphasises a third incentive to comply, the 
concern of states with their reputation, particularly the impact of reputation on the 
ability of the state to enter into international agreements in the future: 
“In the absence of specific retaliation, governments may still have incentives to 
comply with regime rules and principles if they … believe that their reputations are at 
stake. The dilemmas of collective action are partially resolved through the device of 
reputation. … [T]he costs of acquiring a bad reputation as a result of rule-violations 
are imposed specifically on the transgressor. As long as a continuing series of issues is 
expected to arise in the future, and as long as actors monitor each others’ behaviour 
and discount the value of agreements on the basis of past compliance, having a good 
reputation is valuable even to the egoist whose role in collective activity is so small 
that she would bear few of the costs of her own malefactions.”
14  
The importance of monitoring provides a role for international organisations to 
shape state behaviour, not by acting as governments with the power to coerce, but by 
providing information which allows self-interested states to respond to the behaviour 
of other states.
15 International organisations therefore help address the credible 
commitment problem in international politics. This argument for the influence of 
international institutions has been extremely influential to subsequent scholarship.  
It is important to note that this approach to state reputation relates to diffuse 
and general responses from other states and unspecified future consequences for wider 
                                                 
12 Keohane 1984, 105. 
13 Keohane 1984, 105. 
14 Keohane 1984, 105, 2005, xvi. 
15 Keohane 1984, 13. 
 9 domestic interests among a diversity of state constituents, to be contrasted with 
specific retaliation within a regime. Keohane gives the example of how acceding to 
the demands of ‘nuts and bolts manufacturers’ for quotas contrary to treaty 
obligations might put possible trade deals for ‘semi-conductor exports’ at risk, and 
talks generally about how free-riding “may prevent a government from being able to 
make beneficial agreements in the future”.
16 The state accepting short-run sacrifices 
does not know what future benefits will flow.
17 Dai, similarly, notes the broad nature 
of these reputational incentives when she writes that “to the extent that a state’s 
compliance with international agreements is driven in part by the desire to acquire a 
good reputation, the international benefit of compliance may go to the entire country”, 
although of course the benefit may fall to a more restricted range of interests (such as 
those affected by a particular treaty).
18  
This emphasis on reputation as the restraint that prevents states from free-
riding on their international obligations has been shared by many other scholars 
writing in or about the rationalist intellectual tradition. As was alluded to above, 
functional regime theory in international relations has intellectual affinities with wider 
work in political science and the other social sciences on the creation of order without 
the routine coercion available to the Weberian state. In political science, it has been 
claimed that the ability of the ‘law merchant’ to monitor merchants’ reputations 
facilitated long-distance trade in medieval Europe.
19 In anthropology, as noted by 
                                                 
16 Keohane 1984, 103, 259. 
17 Keohane 1982. 
18 Dai 2006, 695, footnote, also 694; also Dai 2007, 21. 
19 Milgrom, North et al. 1990. 
 10 Keohane, it has been argued that order is maintained among small groups in 
‘primitive societies’ through the concern for individual reputation.
20  
In the study of international law, reputational incentives have long been 
argued to influence state behaviour, including (but not only) in formulations 
influenced by rational choice and functional regime theory approaches.
21 More 
interestingly perhaps, reputational incentives – rather than state enforcement – as the 
solution to the difficulties of social order have been widely applied in the study of 
‘law and economics’ with the emphasis on equilibria in repeated games where, 
assuming that information and discount rate requirements can be satisfied, players are 
willing to forgo present profits in exchange for a good reputation that will yield higher 
future profits.
22 Among prominent examples of this broad class of scholarship, each 
of course with its own distinctive emphasis, a study of contractual relations amon
diamond dealers argues, ‘it is primarily the fear of damage to reputation that 
maintains discipline in the diamond trade, not the bourse’s board of arbitrators or the 
procedural right to appeal arbitrated decisions in court’ and an interpretation of 
dispute settlement among the Nuer people of the Southern Sudan claims that the 
influence of the ‘leopard-skin chief’ as arbitrator, despite the striking absence of 
‘Weberian stateness’, derives not from moral considerations but from the chief’s 
ability to serve as a communication device to facilitate bargaining and orchestrate 
individual, self-interested behaviour into socially coherent outcomes.
g 
                                                
23 All these 
 
20 Colson 1974; cf. Keohane 1984, 94 (footnote), 106. 
21 e.g. Machiavelli 1985 [1532]; Schelling 1960; Henkin 1979; Slaughter 
Burley 1993; Chayes and Chayes 1995; Guzman 2008. 
22 E.g. Heymann 1973; Klein and Leffler 1981; Ellickson 1986. 
23 Bernstein 1992, 152; Bates 1983, 11-12. 
 11 examples of social order without state enforcement are easily understood by the 
international relations scholar versed in functional regime theory.  
To summarise therefore, functional regime theory, with its emphasis on 
Coaseian bargains between states and reputational incentives for compliance, has been 
part of a broad trend in social science towards the understanding of circumstances 
where reputational incentives can produce social order, particularly when combined 
with mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and monitor behaviour. It has proved 
enormously influential.
24 Functional regime theory was an important step forward in 
the application of economic reasoning to international politics and a central part of 
Keohane’s enormous contribution to the development of modern international 
political economy.
25  
Criticisms of Functional Regime Theory 
Functional regime theory’s scholarly success has always coexisted with very 
considerable dissent. After Hegemony was most fiercely criticised by realist scholars 
who argued that the fundamental restriction on international cooperation was state 
concern for relative gains of potential adversaries.
26 Even where Pareto-improving 
bargains were possible and proofed from incentives for unilateral defection, states 
have incentives not to cooperate if cooperation could lead to changes in the balance of 
power. Other critics plausibly argued that distributional concerns and rent-seeking are 
frequently more important than efficiency concerns, both where some states use 
credible threats of exclusion to force others to accept international regulations which 
                                                 
24 E.g. Simmons 2000; Tomz 2007. 
25 Alt 1986; Moravcsik forthcoming. 
26 Grieco 1988; Baldwin 1993; Mearsheimer 1994/1995. 
 12 were welfare-diminishing, and where state officials use international institutions to 
shirk domestic accountabilities and more easily provide inefficient policies 
27 
Others have more directly discussed reputation itself as a mechanism. Many 
scholars – often while accepting that states have incentives to maintain their 
reputations – have emphasised the inherent ambiguities associated with the concept of 
reputation. States may have different reputations for different issue-areas, may value a 
reputation for toughness as well as a reputation for cooperation, and may value other 
goals more highly.
28 Others – correctly in my view – have suggested that it may be 
better to focus only on ‘reputation for compliance’ (or ‘reputation for cooperation’) 
and group other, sometimes contradictory, reputational incentives among the other 
variables that can also affect state behaviour in a multivariable setting.
29   
More broadly, it has been argued that the conditions for reputational effects 
are not well specified and as such reputation as a mechanism is almost a ‘passe-
partout’ – a skeleton key which apparently opens every lock.
30 Certainly, many 
scholars notice that reputational incentives do not always seem to influence state 
behaviour or even to influence state behaviour as reliably as the compelling basic 
theory would suggest
31.  
                                                 
27 Vaubel 1986; Krasner 1991; Oatley and Nabors 1998; Moravcsik 1998. 
28 E.g. Downs and Jones 2002; Keohane 1997; Goldsmith and Posner 2005, 
103. Note that this paper provides reasons why reputational incentives may be more 
or less influential in different issue-areas, but also provides an explanation why some 
states might be more cooperative across many issue-areas, or put a different way, have 
political incentives to reliably submit to costs from derived international cooperation 
even where such costs fall on many diverse organised interests. 
29 Guzman 2008, 115-117. 
30 Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 1997, 174-176, 210. 
31 Although some scholars place great reliance on reputation e.g. Tomz 2007, a 
sceptical view of reputational incentives is widespread e.g. Goldsmith and Posner 
2005; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008. It is worth noting that the frequently limited 
influence of reputation in practice has been acknowledged by its most influential 
 13 An important limitation of functional regime theory is its very limited 
consideration of domestic politics, a subject to which this paper will return. Of course 
the modelling of the interaction of domestic and international politics has advanced a 
great deal in recent years.
32 Some of this literature has even started to directly 
integrate domestic politics and reputational concerns: for example Tomz argues, “A 
good reputation will be of special value to groups that profit from international 
exchange but bring little utility to groups that prefer autarky or isolation. Thus, 
domestic groups do not share equally in the reputation gains from respecting 
international agreements”.
33 Nevertheless, although functional regime theory adopts a 
simple approach towards modelling domestic politics, by casting international 
cooperation as a Prisoners’ Dilemma it does not appear to avoid discussion of ‘hard’ 
cases where there are domestic incentives for unilateral defection.
34  
Finally, the versions of anarchy, state egoism, and state rationality adopted by 
functional regime theory, which fit into the broad approach of rational institutionalist 
understandings of behaviour, where self-interested actors follow rules for 
instrumentalist reasons, are rejected by scholars who adopt more sociological 
                                                                                                                                            
theoretician, R.O. Keohane: “In After Hegemony I relied heavily on reputation as a 
motivation for compliance with international commitments (pp. 105-106). Indeed my 
next research project was an attempt to demonstrate the importance of reputation for 
compliance. Research, however, has an interesting way of revealing the unexpected, 
and what I found did not match my expectations. In examining U.S. compliance, of 
lack thereof, with its international commitments, I found more noncompliance than I 
have expected (extending over the history of the United States between 1776 and 
1989). Reputational concerns, though genuine, seemed to have less impact on policy 
than I had expected. Since I have not have not yet invented a theory that would 
compellingly account for the great variations in compliance that I found, much of this 
research has not led to publication. But it has made me wiser, and more cautious, 
about reputation as an incentive for compliance.” in Keohane 2005, xvi. 
32 E.g. Moravcsik 1997; Milner 1997; Milner 1998. 
33 Tomz unpublished, 3. 
34 E.g. Stein 1982; Guzman 2008. 
 14 approaches to institutions, finding the requirements for reputation to provide reliable 
restraint on rationalist egoists so restrictive that they provide no expectation of 
compliance with costly obligations.
35  
To summarise, therefore, scholarly criticism of functional regime theory falls 
into several different and important categories: those that limit the scope of the theory 
because of relative gains and other distributional concerns; those that – while 
accepting the influence of state reputation – nevertheless maintain that reputation 
needs further specification to be a useful causal mechanism; those who broadly reject 
rationalist approaches to institutions, including international institutions; and finally 
those who emphasise functional regime theory’s very limited incorporation of 
domestic politics.
36 In general, apart from the more fundamental concerns of the 
sociological institutionalists, criticisms tend to bound the scope of applicability of 
functional regime theory, with a frequent emphasis on the difficulties of providing 
information on state behaviour in practice, rather than reject its central argument. To 
the contrary, functional regime theory’s explanation for cooperation by rational, 
egoist states with diverse economic interests which have incentives to bargain to 
ensure the efficient production of externalities and which comply with costly 
international bargains because of a concern for reputational benefits in the future 
forms the foundation for many hundreds of papers in international relations 
scholarship.  
                                                 
35 Kratochwil 1989, 108-109; cf. Hall and Taylor 1996; for a survey in relation 
to international regime theory, see Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 1997, 136-210; more 
recently, e.g. Sharman 2007. 
36 These criticisms are acknowledged in Keohane 2005. 
 15 State Reputation as a Public Good 
The rationalist approach to compliance with international agreements based on 
state concerns for reputation is widely accepted. However, there are good theoretical 
reasons, entirely within the rationalist/ collective action theory tradition and separate 
from the scope limitations advanced by existing scholarship, why the reputation based 
approach does not provide a basis for reliable international cooperation. Even where 
there are no relative gains concerns, and where relevant state behaviour and 
reputations can be clearly observed, states should not be expected to prioritise their 
reputational concerns.  
Consider the problem described above, where ‘manufacturers of nuts and 
bolts’ are seeking a quota on imports. This is a trade problem, a fitting example since 
functional regime theory is in many ways the generalisation of a certain understanding 
of the GATT international trading regime.
37 The central political economy problem of 
trade is commonly thought to be made up of two parts. First, concentrated economic 
interests tend to be politically powerful compared to diffuse interests such as 
consumers or taxpayers.
38 Second, concentrated economic interests have incentives to 
pursue income transfers regardless of externalities imposed on society as a whole.
39 
Small groups pay 100% of costs accepted to provide public goods, while reaping only 
tiny benefits, while they gain 100% of gains from inefficient rent-seeking while 
suffering only a tiny proportion of overall efficiency losses. Small groups are 
therefore associated with both disproportionate political power and incentives to 
demand inefficient redistribution of income: that explains both the political 
                                                 
37 Keohane 2005. 
38 Bastiat 1965 [1845-1848]; Schattschneider 1935; Olson 1965; cf. Keohane 
1984, 211. 
39 Olson 1982, 44. 
 16 effectiveness of the ‘manufacturers of nuts and bolts’ and the nature of the policy 
goals they seek. 
Let us consider therefore two alternatives. First, consider a world where the 
manufacturers demand a quota from a government which has not entered into an 
international agreement. Under such circumstances, governments will balance the 
political power of the protectionist interest against the interests of consumers and 
gains in economic efficiency from free trade. In such circumstances, to put it at a 
minimum, one cannot expect that consumer interests and economic efficiency will be 
politically successful. The long and diverse history of protectionism tells as much. 
The theoretical reason is that aggregate consumption and economic efficiency are 
public goods from which the concentrated economic interest has incentives to decline 
to accept costs to support.  
Now consider an alternative world where the manufacturers demand a quota 
from a government that has entered into an international agreement with other states 
which forbids a quota for nuts and bolts imports. To be sure, in the anarchy of 
international relations, the government cannot be prevented from unilaterally adopting 
domestic laws contrary to international obligations. As far as incentives are 
concerned, however, functional regime theory claims that the international agreement 
adds an additional element to the government’s cost benefit analysis: the possible cost 
to state reputation of free-riding on its international commitments. In this second 
scenario, the government will add to aggregate consumption and economic efficiency 
the long-term damage to possible agreements in a variety of other issue-areas, and 
balance those against the political power of the concentrated protectionist interest.  
The point to note is that the structure of the domestic problem in this second 
situation is extremely similar to that in the first. In both cases, the concentrated 
 17 interest is being weighed against public goods. For – particularly in the adoption of 
the definition of state reputation incentives as something distinct from avoiding direct 
retaliation – the gains accruing to the state deriving from a reputation for compliance 
with costly obligations, even if they are as powerful as the gains from economic 
efficiency associated with unilateral free trade, are diffuse – ‘going to the whole 
country’, or to all the groups which might benefit from the effectiveness of a 
particular treaty. As such the gains from state reputation are a public good, and there 
is no reason to expect the concentrated economic interest to accept costs to support 
such gains, nor is there any reason to assume that it will be politically possible to 
suppress the political influence of such concentrated economic interests seeking to 
‘selectively exit’ from treaty obligations, any more than to assume that groups seeking 
economic inefficiency are likely to be politically suppressed.
40 To be sure, the 
concentrated economic interest using its political power to obtain the violation of an 
international trade agreement would be disrupting even more public goods than the 
concentrated economic interest merely obtaining inefficient transfers of resources 
where these would not disrupt international cooperation. Concentrated economic 
interests have frequently shown themselves capable, however, of simultaneously 
imposing multiple costs on wider society.  
After Hegemony’s influential discussion of rationalist mechanisms for 
compliance therefore requires careful reading. The tit-for-tat solution to the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma is robust, where the necessary conditions hold, but obvious applications of 
this argument – direct retaliation, imposing costs on clearly identified domestic 
groups that would otherwise be receiving benefits – are not much emphasised in 
practice; the importance of restraint based on reputation in the hope of diffuse future 
                                                 
40 On 'selective exit', see Weiler 1985. 
 18 gains is emphasised in practice, but no similarly robust model is developed to explain 
such restraint, for which the Prisoners’ Dilemma appears ill-suited because the current 
costs are concentrated and future gains are diffuse.    
This is where the analogy between functional regime theory and wider 
approaches in political science and the other social sciences to the production of social 
order through reputational incentives has been misleading. The reputations generated 
by the behaviours of the tribesman, the merchant in medieval Europe, and the 
contemporary diamond dealer, discussed above, are all private goods. The same actor 
– individuals, sometimes firms or families – assume both the costs and the benefits, 
and have incentives to internalise a stream of future benefits in their decision to accept 
present costs. The reputation generated by state behaviour in functional regime theory 
is a public good as far as individuals or organised groups are concerned where costs 
fall to particular groups but benefits are diffuse and unknown. As a result, no 
individuals or organised groups have incentives to internalise the advantages of state 
reputation and thus no individuals or organised groups have incentives to internalise 
the stream of benefits that self-restraint may bring. These are very different 
circumstances. Although such comparisons can be stimulating, order in international 
relations cannot therefore be directly compared with social order among medieval 
merchants or modern tribesmen, because international relations is not the study of the 
behaviour of individuals operating in anarchy, but the study of the behaviour in 
anarchy of organisations whose policy is directed by some fraction – often a very 
small and changing fraction – of large and diverse populations. 
The problem here is the same as that discussed in relation to the very limited 
incentives for state restraint deriving from damage to a regime as a whole or from the 
precedent that a defection may provide for other states: the lack of incentive to fully 
 19 internalise these benefits. Damage to state reputation is a ‘weak reed’ as far as 
incentives for individuals or groups are concerned, from whose standpoints the proper 
comparison is not between the benefits of rule-breaking to them and its total costs to 
society as a whole, but between its benefits and its costs to them as individuals or 
groups. The domestic collective action problem militates against a priority for state 
reputation, even where a strong reputation for cooperation would provide considerable 
benefits and where non-contribution therefore creates a collective bad. 
The highly relevant literature on collective reputational incentives in 
economics finds that even in the presence of collective gains rational individuals and 
firms fail to invest in reputation-enhancing behaviour. For regional or speciality 
product producers, such as Washington apple growers, in the absence of mechanisms 
to trace products to particular producers – that is, in the absence of making 
contributions to collective reputation a private good – or to collectively regulate 
minimal standards, individual firms have incentives to choose quality levels which are 
suboptimal for the group as a whole.
41 More generally, mechanisms to exclude non-
contributing individuals from collective reputation-holding groups are necessary to 
ensure optimal production of reputation, because individual and collective rationality 
are at odds.
42 Even the famous example of tit-for-tat-based mutual restraint in World 
War One’s trench warfare required compatible collective action solutions within the 
opposing armies.
43 Arguments for the effectiveness of state reputational incentives 
need to find similar explanations for the priority given to state reputation by firms and 
individuals in national politics, where cost-shifting and rent-seeking is a pervasive 
incentive.  
                                                 
41 E.g. Winfree and McCluskey 2005; Pouliot and Sumner 2008. 
42 Tirole 1996. 
43 Axelrod 1984. 
 20 This discussion of the theoretical difficulties associated with functional regime 
theory’s argument that state reputation acts as a powerful mechanism for states to 
accept costs for international obligations is further supported by recent discussions of 
the Coase theorem. Recall that functional regime theory derived intellectual support 
from the Coase theorem’s suggestion that, in the presence of suitable liability 
conventions and sufficiently low transactions costs, rational actors can bargain to 
achieve efficient accommodation of externalities. Applied to international relations, 
this suggested that international regimes and institutions helped governments achieve 
their Coaseian bargains by defining liabilities and lowering transactions costs between 
states whose policies create externalities for other states. Indeed, transactions costs are 
seen as the central difficulty preventing international Coaseian bargains.  
In this sense, functional regime theory is part of a wider intellectual movement 
seeking to apply Coaseian concepts to politics.
44 With sufficiently low transaction 
costs, perhaps because institutions lower the costs of transactions, Pareto-improving 
political bargains are possible. However, these Coaseian approaches to politics have 
undergone repeated and telling criticisms. Where the number of individual actors 
involved is large, there is no expectation that Coaseian bargains are possible. The 
problem is not (only) that transactions costs rise as numbers increase, but rather that 
free-riding becomes pervasive.
45 
Indeed, it has been influentially argued that Coaseian bargains cannot be 
sustained where externalities fall on a sufficiently large group of participants, even if 
there are no transactions costs hindering Coaseian bargaining: “Individuals will try to 
cut themselves out of Coaseian bargains even if transactions costs are zero”, because 
                                                 
44 E.g. Wittman 1995. 
45 Olson 1965; Hardin 1982; Sandler 1992; Olson 2000. 
 21 receiving the benefits of a Coaseian bargain without contributing towards its costs is 
preferable to the Coaseian bargain itself.
46 
So, on the assumption that states contain a variety of different interests, one of 
which is called upon to accept costs to support state’s reputation for reliable 
cooperation to provide future diffuse gains, the fundamental problem is one of free-
riding among domestic interests, not of transaction costs between states. The problem 
is not solved if only a small number of states are the key actors in international 
regimes.
47 Rather, the mechanism for the influence of international regimes, whether 
seen as institutions which can reduce transactions costs between states or even reduce 
transaction costs among firms and groups within cooperating states, is dependent on 
solution of demanding domestic collective action problems among the diversity of 
interests within states.  
To conclude this section then, functional regime theory claims that rational 
egoist states can produce cooperative behaviour in costly issue-areas where gains 
from cooperation exist and the presence of low transaction costs and sufficient 
information on behaviour of other states is combined with repeated interactions 
because of reputational incentives to accept costs on particular interests in favour of 
diffuse long-term gains. This approach to international politics has been very widely 
accepted. Nevertheless, it is not convincing. There is an unexamined assumption of a 
solution to domestic public goods problems in the argument. Given that state 
reputation – considered as the willingness to accept costs in the interest of unspecified 
future gains from international cooperation – is a public good, then, as with other 
                                                 
46 Olson 2000, 84; Dixit and Olson 2000. 
47 cf. Keohane 1984, 258. 
 22 public goods, the general expectation must be that state reputation will be persistently 
undersupplied.  
Implications of State Reputation as a Public Good 
There are many implications for research on international relations, 
international cooperation, and international regimes which can be derived from 
understanding state reputation as a public good. Several are worth particular 
emphasis.  
First, and most important, state reputation per se does not provide a reliable 
explanation for state compliance with costly international obligations. Even where 
significant externalities exist, transactions costs are low, monitoring of state behaviour 
is reliable, and discount rates are low, the correct expectation is that there will be no 
reliable international cooperation if states are expected to accept costs on particular 
interests in return for diffuse future gains, whether diffuse gains for the country as a 
whole or diffuse gains for a more restricted set of interests affected by a particular 
regime. 
Second, distinct from the previous point, state reputation as a mechanism does 
not provide an explanation for any particular level of actual compliance by states with 
international obligations. States which have reputational incentives to accept costs on 
particular interests may comply fully, partially in many permutations, or not at all. To 
argue that states will accept costs on particular organised interests in the expectation 
of reputational gains is to state that they will behave in that way ‘to the degree that 
domestic public goods problems can be overcome’ or, alternatively, ‘assuming that 
diffuse gains are prioritised in domestic politics’. As such, reputation as an incentive 
for state behaviour does not provide any reason for any particular outcome in 
international politics. It is compatible with all outcomes. 
 23 A third implication, a straightforward consequence of the previous two but 
deserving separate emphasis, is that references to reputation, unsupported by analysis 
of the political opportunities available to adversely affected interests, cannot possibly 
provide an explanation for a pervasive, consistent, and reliable compliance with 
international obligations that impose costs on a variety of organised domestic 
interests. While perhaps a certain spluttering, on-again/off-again, compliance might 
result from reputational incentives, consistent with the above statement ‘to the degree 
that domestic public goods problems can be overcome’, routine obedience to costly 
obligations cannot be derived from this mechanism, absent further elaboration. For 
example, widespread claims that states persistently refrain from unilaterally acting 
contrary to costly European Community law obligations for ‘reputational’ reasons, 
without elaboration of why affected organised interests acquiesce in such self-
restraint, should be considered unpersuasive.
48 After all, adversely affected organised 
interests in particular issue-areas have little incentives to accept costs to support the 
broader public goods derived from the EU regime.  
                                                 
48 Many discussions of why EU Member States submit to the stream of 
obligations derived from European Community law appeal, in the final analysis, to 
‘reputation’ as the reason that states do not act unilaterally contrary to European treaty 
obligations, see e.g. Burley [Slaughter] and Mattli 1993, 50, 54; Pollack 1997, 118; 
Alter 2001, 194. Note that while European Community law doctrines of supremacy 
and direct effect claim that national judges must apply European Community law 
regardless of national legislation, national courts derive the application of European 
Community law from national legislation (the national laws implementing the 
European treaties) which national parliaments could unilaterally amend or restrict – 
see e.g. Hartley 1999, 176-177. As described above, references to the reputation 
incentive do not explain why EU Member States persistently exercise self-restraint 
and submit to European Community law, because an explanation for why diffuse 
gains will be prioritised in national politics is needed to complete such an explanation; 
the reputation claim is only a starting point, and indeed a starting point better suited to 
explaining why states would not comply with such costs (e.g. it would be entirely 
reasonable to write, instead of claims that reputation prevents such unilateralism, that 
concerns for state reputation would be only a limited and unreliable incentive 
weighing against such unilateralism on behalf of particular interests). 
 24 Fourth, recognising state reputation as a public good requires a rethinking of 
existing literature derived from functional regime approaches to explaining 
cooperation in international politics. Where intensive international cooperation is 
observed and states submit to obligations which impose costs on concentrated 
interests in return for diffuse future gains, whether from particular regimes or 
international cooperation more generally, functional regime theory’s emphasis on 
information-and-reputation overstates the contribution of low international transaction 
costs and understates the contribution of domestic politics to this outcome. The 
equilibrium we observe is one importantly derived from a solution to domestic 
political problems. Without attempting to control for domestic public goods provision, 
measures of the impact of information provision, the discount rate to be applied to a 
stream of future gains, et cetera, on international cooperation will be biased and 
unreliable. Similarly, where claims for the influence of international organisations as 
solutions to international commitment problems have been drawn from functional 
regime theory, the influence of international organisations on state behaviour in these 
scenarios also relies on a suitable solution to the relevant domestic political problems. 
Absent such solutions, there is no reason to expect reliable internalisation of 
incentives for restraint. If the gains from defection are concentrated, and the costs 
from defection are diffuse, international organisations do not solve the international 
commitment problem as functional regime theory suggests, because the underlying 
domestic incentives do not conform to the Prisoners’ Dilemma on which the model 
relies. Put another way, a lot of internal problems must be solved before international 
institutions can be expected to restrain, even intermittently, state behaviour driven by 
the political power of small organised groups.  
 25 The Internalisation of Reputational Incentives in Domestic Politics 
So far this paper has outlined an important theoretical difficulty with state 
reputation as a mechanism for producing reliable restraint and order between states. 
The argument of this paper both supports the findings of those scholars who have not 
found reputational incentives very binding in practice, by supplying the theoretical 
weakness to match disappointing empirical findings, and suggests that many potential 
gains from international cooperation are likely to remain unrealised.  
Of course, the validity of many existing explanations for international 
cooperation remain unaffected by the argument advanced above, including 
international cooperation in ‘coordination’ issue-areas where states lack incentives to 
defect, or international cooperation organised by a hegemon (or a k-group).
49 
Despite this caveat, however, the broad thrust of this paper’s conclusion is that 
arguments for effective international cooperation cannot be divorced from 
understandings of domestic politics. Although functional regime theory may appear to 
provide an all-purpose explanation for international cooperation which can be kept 
distinct from domestic political assumptions, it is rather the case that no claim to the 
influence of the basic incentive for state behaviour that functional regime theory relies 
upon can plausibly be advanced without an accompanying claim about domestic 
internalisation of costs and benefits. Note that the argument here is not that 
reputation-based influences on state behaviour should be combined, in a pluralist 
multivariate manner, with a variety of other potential influences, including domestic 
political influences, to explain state behaviour. Such pluralism and multi-causal 
approaches are always welcome, but in the case of the potential impact of state 
                                                 
49 Coordination issues: Stein 1982; Martin 1992; Hegemonic cooperation: 
Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Kindleberger 1973; Keohane 1980; The k-group: 
Schelling 1978; Snidal 1985; Gowa 1989. 
 26 reputation it is not enough: an appeal to the expectation that state reputation will exert 
any influence on state behaviour requires an explicit argument about internalisation of 
future gains in domestic politics.  
Of course, there is already a huge variety of domestic politics explanations for 
variation in state behaviour, many of which are unrelated to the internalisation of 
stream of diffuse future gains from cooperation. Even in the area of international 
economic exchange, state behaviour facilitating trade and investment may result, for 
example, from the compatibility of dominant but divergent interest groups across 
states.
50 The politics of many international economic decisions seems likewise to 
depend directly on the balance of organised groups or constituencies expecting 
specific losses or gains on that particular decision, without any evidence of 
internalisation of how different decisions would impact on a state’s future reputation 
As such, the argument presented does not reject forms of international cooperation 
based on direct balances of organised groups within states. The characteristic example 
would be the GATT, now WTO trade, regime, where states unanimously agree 
concessions, after careful preparation and calculation, which impose costs particular 
interests specifically in return for identified gains for other organised interests 
according to the domestic political calculus, and where states frequently are left with 
considerable room to accommodate demands for protection by organised interests 
both within the regime (by raising tariffs within their ‘bound rates’ for example) and 
outside it, by persistent unilateralism contrary to GATT/WTO obligations, even to the 
cost of ‘accepting’ retaliation.
51 Note, however, that it is this careful balance of 
concentrated costs and benefits, not any diffuse reputational incentive, which makes 
                                                 
50 Broz 1997. 
51 Lawrence 2003. 
 27 such a regime restrain state behaviour to the degree that it does, and as such there is 
no reason to expect unilateralism to be restrained if the domestic balance of organised 
groups changes, or if costs on particular groups turn out to be more significant than 
anticipated. 
Rather, however, than attempting to summarise the vast literature on domestic 
politics and international relations, this paper will outline two broad scenarios where 
the reputation incentives can be expected to be reliably internalised in domestic 
politics.  
First, state reputation might effectively be a private good. Where the costs of 
compliance with costly international obligations fall on the same groups that will gain 
from the future stream of reputational benefits, then under those circumstances, 
assuming once again that the other criteria – effective monitoring arrangements, 
repeated interaction, and so on – are met, then the logic of functional regime theory 
holds convincingly. So issue-specific cooperation between states in relation to 
industrial policy cooperation where the industry itself will receive the future gains of 
self-restraint is a scenario where reputation concerns can be reliably internalised. 
Cooperation in the form of mutual self-restraint among countries with dominant oil 
companies, or where the cooperation largely relates to the activities of a dominant 
bank in each country, is entirely plausible, along the lines of the repeated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma. These groups have incentives to cooperate in the manner that functional 
regime theory explains, although such incentives may, of course, in any particular 
case be overwhelmed or even intensified by other factors, domestic or international. 
To avoid misunderstanding, it may be worth emphasising that international 
cooperation where reputation is a private good is still difficult – there is still an 
incentive for unilateral defection, which is why Prisoners’ Dilemmas are often 
 28 considered the ‘hard’ cases for international cooperation. However situations where 
state reputation is a public good are even more difficult conditions for international 
cooperation, compared to which the Prisoners’ Dilemma model is indeed relatively 
easy. Assumption of the applicability of the Prisoners’ Dilemma model can therefore 
tend to understate the difficulties associated with many forms of international 
cooperation. 
Although reputational arguments are plausible where state reputation is 
effectively a private good, the scope of application of functional regime theory has not 
previously been allocated to such restricted territory, nor is this explanation a good 
match for the original reputation scenario which claimed that there were incentives to 
accept costs on one group in order to provide future benefits for unknown or diffuse 
others. On the other hand, as we have seen, reputational incentives should not be 
expected to affect state behaviour where current costs fall on particular groups but 
future gains are diffuse. In the case of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits, reliable 
international cooperation can only be expected where the claim is supplemented by a 
solution to the domestic public goods problems. 
The literature on the politics of public goods production is also too large to be 
summarised here. Two possibilities are however worth mentioning in particular. First, 
where a relatively limited group will receive both costs and benefits from maintaining 
costly commitments, then cartel-like or other bonds of internal organisation may solve 
the public goods problems for this restricted group.
52 This scenario is in some senses 
close to the private goods example discussed above, and it may at times be acceptable 
for empirical studies to assume that such restricted groups can solve their internal 
collective action problems, but it also shows the importance of ensuring contributions 
                                                 
52 E.g. Lipson 1985; Veitch 1986. 
 29 to public good provision even within defined groups expecting to receive a stream of 
benefits from compliance with costly obligations. 
Second, where concentrated costs fall on defined groups but benefits are 
diffuse in a wider sense, one possible solution for this collective action problem is 
forms of organisation which have incentives to respond to large constituencies and 
possess the necessary coordinating authority to effectively impose costs on particular 
constituents in order to provide public goods for the wider constituency as a whole. In 
labour market politics, for example, inclusive and centralised trade union federations, 
with control over firm-level union bargaining and strike activity, have been found to 
provide higher levels of labour market public goods – lower levels of inflation and 
unemployment, fewer strikes, etc – than pluralist trade union systems.
53 Similar 
arguments have been advanced that cross-industry enterprise business groups can 
internalise the benefits of accepting costs on particular industry sectors.
54 These 
solutions to collective action problems may offer the sort of explanation required to 
expect that states will reliably internalise the advantages of prioritising state 
reputation where doing so requires accepting costs on particular groups in return for 
diffuse and uncertain gains in other issue-areas. The more reliably that domestic 
collective action problems relating to prioritising state reputation can be overcome, 
the more states should have political incentives to comply with costly obligations and 
perhaps even to accept less ‘gate-keepered’ specification of obligations, such as 
autonomous international tribunals and majority voting on regime obligations. 
Indeed, a robust solution to the relevant domestic public goods problem could 
provide an explanation for pervasive, consistent, and reliable state compliance with 
                                                 
53 Olson 1982; Schmitter 1981; Calmfors and Driffill 1988. 
54 Jankowski 1989. 
 30 international obligations that impose costs in an ‘un-gate-keepered’ manner on a 
variety of organised domestic interests in return for diffuse gains, an outcome which 
neither neoliberal institutionalist claims for the influence of international institutions 
through information, nor carefully calculated specific reciprocity deals based on a 
balance of concentrated interests, in the GATT/WTO style, can explain. While of 
course such collective action solutions may relate to the interests affected by a 
particular regime, a state might possess domestic institutions which generally address 
the difficulties of imposing costs on concentrated interests for diffuse gains to the 
degree that it would prove pervasively reliable in international cooperation across 
many issue-areas. 
Unlike scenarios where state reputation is a private good, where the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma model holds straightforwardly but which cannot explain the acceptance of 
costs on one concentrated interests in return for future diffuse gains, these domestic 
solutions to public goods solutions can indeed explain why costs might be accepted on 
concentrated interests to secure diffuse gains from a treaty regime or international 
cooperation more generally, in the manner that the original reputation argument 
suggested. Note that international cooperation of this sort does not, however, so 
clearly match the Prisoners’ Dilemma model, because it is internal solutions to 
collective action problems, rather than the future behaviour of other states, which is 
primarily driving such state behaviour.  
This brief discussion of means of internalising the benefits of state reputation 
in domestic politics provides only a conceptual starting point for further discussion 
and development. The important point for future empirical work relying on state 
reputation for expectations of compliance with costly obligations should indicate 
whether the future benefits of compliance are likely to fall to the same groups or 
 31 individuals who are expected to absorb costs, in which case state reputation can be 
considered a private good, or whether, alternatively, future benefits of compliance are 
likely to fall to other, perhaps wider, groups than the groups or individuals who are 
expected to absorb costs, in which case the general expectation should be of limited 
compliance, absent the specification of a solution to the relevant domestic collective 
action problem.  
To reiterate, these are not the only possible mechanisms for reliable 
international cooperation, nor the only possible domestic politics based explanations, 
but these two broad categories – reputation as a private good and reputation as a 
public good combined with a solution to the relevant public goods problems – are 
explanations for reliable international cooperation driven by reputational concerns. 
Considering state reputation as a public good may also offer new perspectives 
on other debates, including for example the impact of democracy on international 
relations. Many argue – although others disagree – that democracies carry over their 
respect for the domestic rule of law, compromise, and adjudication, into the 
international arena.
55 It may be better, however, to start from the point of view that 
rulers of democratic states are, by definition, selected by large groups, and so they are 
likely at the margin to provide their constituents with a mix of services that includes a 
higher proportion of public goods and fewer private goods.
56 As a result, entirely for 
incentives to provide public goods, and not because of any transfer of norms from 
domestic politics, democratic states at the margin should be expected to take state 
                                                 
55 The literature on democracy and international cooperation is too large to 
summarise. The argument that domestic norms affect democratic behaviour in this 
way can be found prominently in e.g. Dixon 1993; Slaughter 1995. 
56 Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow et al. 1999; Olson 2000. 
 32 reputation into account more consistently when reputational concerns require the 
acceptance of costs on particular organised interest in return for diffuse gains.  
This argument certainly has its limits however. Even in democracies, 
politicians frequently seek re-election by providing private goods to concentrated 
interests. The ability of democratic states to prioritise state reputation is therefore the 
result of domestic political conflict over public goods, rather than the result of diffuse 
respect for compromise and adjudication, and issue-specific groups should be 
expected to demand and frequently obtain defection from costly international 
obligations.
57 The same US democracy that provides incentives for politicians to 
provide overall economic growth through trade liberalisation also provides 
opportunities for issue-specific economic or organised ethnic group interests to 
mobilise against accepting costs for diffuse reputational reasons.
58 Democratic states 
also vary considerably among themselves in the degree that authoritative political 
institutions provide political power to small constituencies, with incentives to impose 
costs on the rest of society, or to broad constituencies, with greater incentives to 
accept costs for public goods.
59 In addition, where future gains from cooperation can 
be considered a private good for particular groups, cooperation may not require the 
solution to demanding domestic collective action problems. As such, while 
                                                 
57 Note that this conflict is not just between those who may gain from 
international cooperation and those who may prefer autarky, as Tomz indicates supra: 
it is a conflict even among those who gain to avoid contributing to public goods.  
58 E.g. mobilisation in the US against WTO steel tariff obligations in 
Devereaux, Lawrence et al. 2006; on Cuban-American mobilisation against the WTO, 
see Hartley 2004, 98-99; on ethnic group mobilisation and US foreign policy, e.g. 
Smith 2000. 
59 For example, it has been argued that, among democracies, unitary states 
(compared with federal states), parliamentary government (compared to separation of 
powers regimes), and closed-list PR electoral systems (compared to ‘first past the 
post’ election systems), lead to greater production of domestic public goods as 
opposed to benefits of concentrated interests. See the literature surveys in Gerring and 
Thacker 2008.  
 33 democracy as such does provide incentives for public goods production, it cannot be 
assumed that democracy as a category will be an especially powerful explanation of 
compliance with costly international commitments.  
Conclusion 
There are many features of international politics and even the politics of state 
reputation that this paper has not addressed. The discussion here is overwhelmingly 
focussed on the politics of trade where diffuse gains often require the imposition of 
costs on issue-specific organised groups, rather than the full range of economic issues 
(foreign direct investment, sovereign lending, etc) where reputational arguments have 
been employed, let alone topics in security studies and crisis bargaining, each of 
which may be characterised by different and distinctive domestic collective action 
problems.
60 In mitigation, this paper addresses the original and most influential claims 
made for functional regime theory, and aims to stimulate thinking about the 
application of reputational arguments to other issue-areas, where reputational 
incentives also require mechanisms for internalisation. Important topics such as how 
states update their evaluation of other states’ reputation have also been neglected here. 
Granted these limitations of scope, this paper has outlined the role of state 
reputation in functional regime theory, discussed existing criticisms and advanced a 
more fundamental one, that state reputation should be seen as a domestic public good 
which should, in the normal case, be persistently undersupplied. The paper has then 
outlined circumstances where reputational incentives can indeed have a powerful 
impact, where future gains derived from prioritising state reputation are either private 
goods accruing to those who accept the costs or where domestic politics provides can 
prioritise the production of diffuse public goods even at the cost to private interests. In 
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 34 well-defined circumstances, whose essential common feature is that a clear argument 
can be advanced for the internalisation of a future stream of benefits, reputational 
incentives for state behaviour can be compelling. Rather than comparing the 
reputational incentives of states to those of individuals, a better understanding of state 
reputational incentives may come from comparisons with reputational incentives 
falling on large and diverse populations with competing internal interests and 
incentives for cost-shifting and rent-seeking, rather than public goods production. 
This paper therefore both helps explain why reputation has often proved of 
limited effectiveness in explaining state behaviour, and also provides better specificity 
over the circumstances where it will be effective, no longer as an all-purpose 
‘skeleton key’, but instead as a specialised device for particular locks. Understanding 
state reputation as a public good addresses a difficulty with the currently dominant 
theoretical argument for international cooperation in a way both that builds on the 
important work of previous scholars and suggests ways forward for the continuing 
development of the application of rationalist approaches to international politics.  
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